Two studies investigated how behavioral information about the morality or intelligence of another person in¯uences impressions, expectations of cooperative behavior, and own cooperation in a mixed-motive interdependence situation. Consistent with the moralityimportance hypothesis, results revealed that morality information in¯uenced impressions, expectations of other's cooperative behavior, as well as own cooperation more strongly than intelligence information, and led to greater con®dence in expectations and better recall. Consistent with the negativity eect hypothesis, negative information about morality and intelligence had more impact on impressions and interactionrelevant measures than positive information. An additional ®nding was that people overall expected more cooperation from others than they were willing to display themselves, and that this dierence was especially pronounced for unintelligent and moral targets. Explanations and implications are discussed from a behavioral-adaptive perspective on impression formation.
In studies of the eects of such outcome dependency on impression formation, two aspects have received little attention. First, this research generally does not involve measures of behavior toward the person who is the object of the impression. Although it is assumed either implicitly or explicitly that outcome dependencyÐor its mutual form, interdependenceÐincreases attention and accuracy motivation becausè thinking is for doing' (Fiske, 1992 ; see also e.g. Bruner & Tagiuri, 1954; Heider, 1958; Jones & Thibaut, 1958) , it is not tested whether or how these impressions actually in¯uence behavior. Participants in such paradigms remain`one-way mirror observers'.
Second, studies on outcome dependency generally investigated either cooperative or competitive dependence, and neglected so-called mixed-motive situations, in which the needs and interests of the persons concerned partly correspond and partly con¯ict (see Fiske & Neuberg, 1990 ; an exception, however, is found in De Dreu, Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1995) . Such situations are important not only because they are quite common in everyday life, but also because they make that one's impression of the other person really matters. Because these situations provide no clues as to whether to view the other as a`partner' or as an`opponent', it becomes especially useful to form an impression of the other person and of the behavior one may expect from him or her, in order to decide how to behave toward this person. We chose to con®ne the current research to a speci®c mixed-motive interdependence context: a two-person social dilemma. This is an interdependence situation in which noncooperation results in greater outcomes for self than cooperation, irrespective of the other's behavior, but in which mutual cooperation yields greater outcomes for both persons than does mutual noncooperative behavior.
AN INTERDEPENDENCE ANALYSIS OF EVALUATIVE PERSON INFORMATION
In the current research, we investigated how people make use of information about another person in a mixed-motive interdependence situation, to form impressions, infer cooperative or non-cooperative intentions of interdependent others, and decide on one's own cooperative or non-cooperative behavior. In two experiments, we provided people with information about past behaviors of interdependent others, systematically varying its descriptive meaning (whether the information is about morality or intelligence) and its evaluative meaning (whether the information is positive, negative, or neutral), Our purpose was to examine the relative importance of morality versus intelligence information, and of positive versus negative information.
of other-pro®tability), and includes traits such as`(dis)honest' and`(in)considerate'. We operationalized this dimension as morality. The second dimension is represented by person characteristics denoting abilities and capacities (or ecacy in attaining one's goals; cf. Peeters & Czapinski's, 1990 , concept of self-pro®tability), and includes traits such as`(un)skilful ' and`(un) intelligent'. This dimension was operationalized as intelligence.
In a mixed-motive interdependence situation, we expect morality information to be more important for a social perceiver than intelligence information (moralityimportance hypothesis). As a social dilemma involves a decision between some gain for self at a larger cost for another person, an important question is whether you can trust the other person to cooperate (e.g. Deutsch, 1973; cf. Apfelbaum, 1974) . In this respect, morality is much more diagnostic than intelligence. As morality can be de®ned as a sense of obligation toward others and the relative absence of harming others (Deutsch, 1982; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994) , one can trust moral persons to be cooperative (and immoral persons to be noncooperative). Intelligence information, on the other hand, is ambiguous in this respect. We can only trust that a smart person will cooperate, if we assume that this person endorses collective rationality (trying to get the best outcomes for all) and not individual rationality (trying to get the best outcomes for the self; cf. Van Lange, Liebrand & Kuhlman, 1990; Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991a; Van Vugt, Van Lange, & Meertens, 1996) . On the basis of intelligence information alone, we cannot reliably infer the basis for rationality (individual or collective) that a person endorses.
Another line of reasoning supporting the morality-importance hypothesis relies on the other-pro®table nature of morality and the self-pro®tability of intelligence. In an interaction situation, a social perceiver will readily interpret the general meaning of morality information,`good or bad for other people', as`good or bad for me'. However, the consequences of another person's intelligence are less clear. If someone is intelligent, and thus able to be`good for him or herself' (i.e. self-pro®tability), a social perceiver still does not know whether he or she will ®nd cooperation or noncooperation the best way to achieve good outcomes.
In sum, we predicted that information about the morality of an interdependent other would in¯uence impressions and interaction-relevant measures (i.e. expected and own cooperation) more strongly than would intelligence information. We expected that intelligence eects would have the same direction as morality eects. Because of the social costs associated with noncooperation, we expected that most people would relate intelligence to cooperation. However, according to the above analysis, we expected these intelligence eects to be less pronounced. more diagnostic in determining the morality of a person than are moral behaviors, because only immoral people are assumed to be willing to act immorally. More recently, motivational explanations have been advanced that consider attending to negative information as functional because it prepares people to respond eectively to threatening circumstances, like, for example, negative outcomes caused by an immoral person (for further evidence and reasoning, see Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Pratto & John, 1991; Reeder, Pryor, & Wojciszke, 1992; Taylor, 1991; Vonk & Van Knippenberg, 1994; Wojciszke, Brycz, & Borkenau, 1993) .
The current research seeks to extend prior research on evaluative asymmetries, advancing the prediction that negativity eects for morality are revealed not only in impressions but also in interaction-relevant measures (negativity eect hypothesis). Speci®cally, we predicted that negative morality information about an interdependent other would exert greater in¯uence on the formation of global evaluative impressions, expectations of the other's cooperation, and own cooperative behavior, than positive morality information. For intelligence information, we advanced no formal predictions. Although positivity eects are sometimes found for intelligence (e.g. Reeder & Fulks, 1980) , it may also be argued that in an actual interaction context, attending to negative intelligence information is functional, because unintelligent people may be perceived as unpredictable, and hence as providing a risky, dangerous environment.
STUDY 1
Participants were paired with a number of (®ctitious) other persons successively, who were described by only one behavioral item that was either moral, immoral, intelligent, unintelligent, or neutral (i.e. not related to either morality or intelligence). The neutral targets served as comparisons for both morality and intelligence targets, and enabled us to test for evaluative asymmetries. Participants engaged in a social dilemma task with these targets. Dependent variables were (1) global impressions of the target person, (2) degree of cooperation expected from the other person, (3) con®dence in expectations, (4) own degree of cooperation, and (5) free recall of behavioral information.
We advanced two sets of hypotheses. First, based on the morality-importance hypothesis, we predicted that eects of morality information (moral versus immoral targets 1 ) on global evaluative impressions, expected cooperation, and own cooperation would be more pronounced overall than eects of intelligence information (intelligent versus unintelligent targets). Also, we predicted more con®dence expressed in expectations based on morality information rather than intelligence information, and better recall of morality behaviors versus intelligence behaviors.
Second, we predicted that favorability of global impressions and levels of expected and own cooperation would decrease for targets described by more negative behavior for both evaluative dimensions. For morality, based on the negativity eect hypothesis, we predicted the dierences between immoral and neutral targets to be more pronounced than the dierences between neutral and moral targets. We did not advance a formal prediction regarding negativity or positivity eects for intelligence.
Finally, in order to examine the interactional consequences of the information at another level, we explored whether dierences between cooperation expected from the target and own cooperation varied with target type.
Method

Overview
The experiment was run self-paced on personal computers in individual cubicles. First, the social dilemma task was explained. Participants then engaged in this twoperson task with a number of (®ctitious) target persons successively, each described by a moral, immoral, intelligent, unintelligent or neutral behavioral description. After a ®ller task, participants were asked to write down all behaviors they could recall on a sheet of paper, Finally, participants were debriefed and paid for participation.
Participants and Design
A total of 125 students at the Free University (81 women, 44 men), recruited by means of an announcement in the university newspaper, participated in this study. The within-participants design included morality of other (moral versus neutral versus immoral) and intelligence of other (intelligent versus neutral versus unintelligent) as within-participant factors.
Procedure
The social dilemma task Participants were told that the study was a decision-making task involving choices between options that would aect the number of points they would get and the number of points that other persons would get. They were told that for every choice they made, they would be paired with another person, about whom they would receive some information before they had to make their choices. They were not told with how many persons they would be paired. The social dilemma task was adopted from prior research (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994; Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991a,b) . Participants were told that upon each new pairing with a person, this person would have four yellow points, each of which was worth 50 Dutch cents to him or her, but worth 100 Dutch cents to the participant. They themselves would have four blue points upon each new pairing, each worth 50 Dutch cents to the participant, but worth 100 Dutch cents to the other person. Participants were told that although the points represented money, the study would not involve additional monetary payos. They were told that their task was to decide how many, pointsÐnone, one, two, three, or fourÐthey would give to the other person, and that the other person would decide how many points he or she would give to them. It was explained that every point transferred results in a 50 cent loss for the giver and a 100 cent gain for the receiver. A few calculation examples followed, and participants were provided with a Impression formation and cooperative behavior 309 table containing the 5 Â 5 payo matrix for the task, displaying the outcomes for both themselves and the other person for all possible combinations of own and other's choices. Participants could consult this table throughout the experiment. Additionally, a 10-item questionnaire to check participants' comprehension of the task was administered, the results of which showed that all participants comprehended the task structure. Following explanation and a comprehension check, it was repeated that upon each pairing with a new person, the participant would again have four blue points, and the other person four yellow points.
Half of the participants ®rst engaged in the social dilemma task with all targets successively, and thereafter rated their global impression of all targets successively. The other half rated their global impression of a target, engaged in the social dilemma task with this target, and then went on to the next target. Preliminary analyses showed no consistent pattern of eects for order, so this variable will not be further discussed.
Manipulation of morality and intelligence Participants were told that they would receive information about recent behavior of the persons with whom they would be paired, by noting that such information may facilitate decision making; 2 otherwise they would know nothing about the other persons. They were also told that these persons would not receive any information about the participant. 3 The behavioral descriptions were selected from a pretest study, in which 50 students rated 73 descriptions of approximately equal lengths. Half of the students ®rst rated the morality of all behaviors (À4 very immoral, 4 very moral), and then their diagnosticity for morality (0 says very little about the morality of the person, 8 says very much about the morality of the person). The other half rated the intelligence (À4 very unintelligent, 4 very intelligent) and the diagnosticity for intelligence (0 says very little about the intelligence of the person, 8 says very much about the intelligence of the person) of the behaviors. Pretest participants were told that all behaviors had been observed among dierent persons. The descriptions were presented in two random orders. Counterbalanced with order, the behaviors rated by half of the pretest participants were displayed by male actors. The other half rated the same behaviors displayed by female actors. Order and gender of actor had no eects on the pretest ratings.
In order to manipulate morality and intelligence as independently as possible, we selected moral items scoring 2.50 or higher on morality, 6.00 or higher on diagnosticity for morality, and scoring at least one scale point lower on intelligence and diagnosticity for intelligence, respectively (all these dierences were signi®cant at p 5 0.05). Immoral items scored À2.50 or lower on morality, 6.00 or higher on diagnosticity for morality, and at least one scale point higher and one scale point lower on intelligence and diagnosticity for intelligence, respectively. Intelligent and unintelligent items were selected using parallel criteria. Finally, we selected neutral items scoring between À1.50 and 1.50 on both morality and intelligence and less than 4.00 on both diagnosticity scales, and not diering in morality and intelligence, nor in diagnosticity for these dimensions. These neutral behavioral descriptions made it possible to test negativity eects, by serving as comparisons for targets described by moral, immoral, intelligent, or unintelligent behavior. The behaviors are listed in the Appendix.
Participants were shown one of these behaviors per target person. For every new target, the behavioral description appeared on the screen, preceded by the messagè You are now paired with a person who displayed the following behavior last week'. The behavioral description remained on the screen while the participants were asked to rate their global impression of the target, and to indicate their expectations, con®dence in expectations, and own cooperation. Participants were paired with 17 targets: 3 persons described by a moral behavior, 3 by an immoral behavior, 3 by an intelligent behavior, 3 by an unintelligent behavior, and 5 by a neutral behavior. An additional neutral target, presented ®rst, served as a practice trial and was excluded from the analyses. The order in which participants were paired with these 17 targets was randomized separately for each participant.
We took several measures to minimize the possibility that speci®c characteristics of the behaviors would in¯uence the results. First, we included relatively more neutral behaviors because these were not domain-speci®c, and therefore more of them were needed in order to form a representative sample of possible behaviors not related to morality or intelligence. Also, we employed two distinct sets of 17 targets; that is, we had selected 34 behaviors in total, and varied Target Set as a between-participants variable. Furthermore, we systematically varied target gender. Counterbalanced with other variations, half of the targets were male in one version, and female in the other version, and vice versa. Preliminary analyses showed no consistent pattern of eects including gender of participants, target set, or target gender version. Hence, these variables will not be further discussed.
Free recall task Finally, after a ®ller task, participants were asked to write down all behavioral descriptions they could remember on a sheet of paper, in words as close as possible to the original formulation. They were asked to spend at least 5 and at most 8 minutes completing this task. The coding of the recalled behaviors was not dicult, because the participants' wording of the recalled behaviors was generally very similar to the original wording. Accordingly, we did not obtain interrater-reliability; one observer just counted the number of behaviors recalled (for similar procedures, see Liebrand, Messick, & Wolters, 1986; cf. Srull, 1981) .
Dependent Measures
Participants were asked how many pointsÐnone, one, two, three, or fourÐthey expected a target to give to them in the social dilemma task (expected cooperation), how con®dent they were about this expectation (À2 not at all con®dent, 2 very con®dent), and how many pointsÐnone, one, two, three, or fourÐthey gave to the target (own cooperation). Also, they rated their global impression of the target on a 5-point scale (À2 very negative, 2 very positive). Finally, the number of moral, Impression formation and cooperative behavior 311 immoral, intelligent, unintelligent, and neutral behavioral descriptions recalled were counted.
Results and Discussion
For all dependent measures except the recall data, mean scores were computed across the moral, the immoral, the intelligent, the unintelligent, and the neutral targets. The unit of analysis for the recall data was the proportion of correctly recalled behaviors per category. These data were subjected to analyses of variance with target as a 5-level within-participant variable. The results of these analyses are displayed in Table 1 , together with the mean scores for the ®ve target types on the dependent measures and the results of post-hoc contrast tests. As can be seen, the main eect of Target was highly signi®cant for all dependent measures. Further, we see that for both morality and intelligence information, targets described by positive behavior generally elicited more favourable impressions, and made participants expect and display greater levels of cooperation than targets described by negative behavior. The only exception was that targets' intelligence did not aect expected cooperation. Also, participants expressed more con®dence in expectations based on morality or intelligence information rather than neutral information; moreover, moral and immoral behaviors were recalled better than neutral behaviors. Intelligent and unintelligent behaviors were recalled relatively poorly. (Results for the dierence between expected and own cooperation will be discussed below.) But were morality eects signi®cantly more pronounced than intelligence eects, as was predicted? And did negative information have more impact than positive information? These questions were addressed by computing a priori contrasts, 4 setting alpha at 0.01 to avoid capitalization on chance eects.
The Importance of Morality
The morality-importance hypothesis stated that the importance of morality over intelligence information would be manifested in two ways. First, morality information would have a greater impact on global impressions, and expected and own cooperation than intelligence information. Second, morality information would lead to more con®dence in expectations and better recall than intelligence information. For global impressions, expected cooperation, and own cooperation, we contrasted the dierence between moral and immoral targets against the dierence between intelligent and unintelligent targets. For all three dependent variables, we found stronger eects for morality than for intelligence. First, both morality and intelligence information aected global impressions (relative to neutral information, see Table 1 ), but the dierence between moral and immoral targets (a mean dierence of 2.74) was more pronounced than the dierence between intelligent and unintelligent targets (a mean dierence of 1.24; t[124] 17.01, p 5 0.0001). Second, as can be seen in Table 1 , intelligence did not aect levels of expected cooperation. Clearly, then, the dierence between moral and immoral targets (a mean dierence of 2.12) was more pronounced than the dierence between intelligent and unintelligent targets (a mean dierence of 0.00; t[124] 17.99, p 5 0.0001). And ®nally, both morality and intelligence information aected own cooperation (see Table 1 ), but again, the dierence between moral and immoral targets (a mean dierence of 1.92) was more pronounced than the dierence between intelligent and unintelligent targets (a mean dierence of 0.58; t[124] 12.97, p 5 0.0001).
For con®dence in expectations and for the recall data, we contrasted moralityinformative targets (i.e. moral and immoral targets combined) against intelligenceinformative targets. Results again supported the morality-importance hypothesis. First, although both morality and intelligence information led participants to express greater con®dence than neutral information (see Table 1 ), this eect was more pronounced for morality than for intelligence. Participants expressed more con®dence in expectations based on morality information (a mean dierence of 0.58), than on intelligence information (a mean dierence of 0.23; t[123] 8.21, p 5 0.0001). Second, there was a clear recall advantage for morality information: Morality information was recalled better (a mean dierence of 0.71) than intelligence information (a mean dierence of 0.40; t[123] 12.54, p 5 0.0001). As can be seen in Table 1 , morality information was recalled better than neutral information, whereas this was not the case for intelligence information (see Table 1 ). In fact, recall of intelligence information was at about the same level as recall of neutral information.
Tests of Evaluative Asymmetries
Morality eects The negativity eect hypothesis stated that dierences between targets described by immoral versus neutral behavior would be more pronounced Note: Global impressions and con®dence ratings were made on 5-point scales ranging from À2 to 2;
higher scores indicate more positive ratings. Expected and own cooperation (and the dierence between them) are in points, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 4. Proportion of recalled behaviors were computed for each target category separately. All df 4,121, except for con®dence ratings df 4,120. Means in the same row that do not share subscripts dier at p 5 0.05. *** p 5 0.0001. than dierences between targets described by moral versus neutral behavior, for global impressions, expected cooperation, and own cooperation. This hypothesis received strong support. For global impressions, the absolute dierence between immoral and neutral targets (a mean dierence of 1.74) was more pronounced than the absolute dierence between moral and neutral targets (a mean dierence of 1.00; t[124] 9.55, p 5 0.0001). Also, for expected cooperation, the absolute dierence between immoral and neutral targets (a mean dierence of 1.32) was more pronounced than the absolute dierence between moral and neutral targets (a mean dierence of 0.80; t[124] 5.98, p 5 0.0001). And ®nally, for own cooperation, the absolute dierence between immoral and neutral targets (a mean dierence of 1.21) was more pronounced than the absolute dierence between moral and neutral targets (a mean dierence of 0.71; t[124] 5.94, p 5 0.0001). As can be seen in Table 1 , no negativity eects for morality were found for con®dence in expectations or for recall of behaviors. Immoral information did not lead to more con®dence than moral information, and immoral behaviors were not recalled better than moral behaviors.
Intelligence eects We investigated possible negativity or positivity eects for intelligence in an exploratory way. Negativity eects for intelligence were found on global impressions and own cooperation. For impressions, the absolute dierence between unintelligent and neutral targets (a mean dierence of 0.83) was more pronounced than the absolute dierence between intelligent and neutral targets (a mean dierence of 0.41; t[124] 6.43, p 5 0.0001). For own cooperation, the absolute dierence between unintelligent and neutral targets (a mean dierence of 0.41) was also more pronounced than the absolute dierence between intelligent and neutral targets (a mean dierence of 0.17; t[124] 3.00, p 5 0.003). Because intelligence did not aect expected cooperation, dierences between unintelligent and neutral, and intelligent and neutral targets did not dier (mean dierences of 0.05 and 0.06, respectively; t 0.03, n.s.). As can be seen in Table 1 , there were no evaluative asymmetries for intelligence in con®dence ratings or recall: Intelligent and unintelligent information led to similar levels of con®dence, and similar levels of recall.
Dierences between Expected and Own Cooperation
An interesting additional ®nding was that participants overall expected more cooperation than they were willing to display themselves (see Table 1 ; F[1,124] 35.34, p 5 0.0001). To investigate whether this tendency was stronger for some targets than for others, we analyzed the dierences between expected and own cooperation (relative bene®t). As can be seen in Table 1 , relative bene®t was largest for unintelligent targets, somewhat smaller for moral and neutral targets, and smallest for immoral and intelligent targets. These results suggest, ®rst, a tendency for participants to take advantage of unintelligent targets relative to all other targets, and second, a tendency to take advantage of moral and neutral targets relative to intelligent and immoral targets. The small dierence between expected and own cooperation for immoral targets could be due to a¯oor eect. Participants expected so little cooperation from these targets that they could hardly be less cooperative themselves. However, the large relative bene®t for unintelligent targets cannot be explained by a¯oor eect.
STUDY 2
The results of Study 1 support both the morality-importance and the negativity eects hypotheses. First, morality information had stronger overall eects on global impressions, expectations of other's cooperation, and own cooperation, and led to greater con®dence in expectations and better recall than intelligence information.
Intelligence behaviors were recalled poorly, suggesting that intelligence information was not processed very thoroughly. Also, intelligence information did not aect levels of expected cooperation. However, we did ®nd higher con®dence ratings for intelligence information than for neutral information, suggesting that participants found intelligence informationÐto some extentÐuseful in deriving expectations. Second, we found negativity eects for morality information on global impressions and cooperation expected and displayed. Unlike previous research, we also found negativity eects for intelligence on global impressions and own cooperation. Finally, participants overall expected more cooperation than they were willing to display themselves. Interestingly, this tendency to increase relative bene®t was especially strong for unintelligent and for moral (and neutral) targets. This seems to suggest that, at least in this single-interaction context, participants tended to take advantage of these types of targets.
We conducted a second study to further investigate the morality-importance and negativity eect hypotheses and the ®ndings pertaining to relative bene®t. An important modi®cation in comparison with the ®rst study was that in this second study, we provided participants with information about both morality and intelligence of target persons. In most impression formation studies (and in our ®rst study), the information participants receive about a target person generally pertains to only one dimension. However, in everyday life situations, people often have information about more than one attribute of a person. Besides being more realistic, the design of the second study also enabled us to explore the conjoint eects of morality and intelligence.
Method
Overview
The procedure was essentially the same as in Study l. First, we explained the social dilemma task and checked participants' comprehension. Again, participants could consult a table containing the 5 Â 5 payo matrix throughout the experiment. Participants engaged in the task with targets described by two behaviors, one either high, neutral, or low in morality, and the other either high, neutral, or low in intelligence, allowing for nine dierent target types. After a ®ller task, an unexpected free recall task of the behavioral descriptions was administered. Again, the experiment was run self-paced on personal computers in individual cubicles. The same dependent variables were used as in Study 1.
Participants and Design
A total of 164 students at the Free University of Amsterdam (99 female, 65 male), recruited by means of an advertisement in the university newspaper, participated in Impression formation and cooperative behavior this study. They were paid for participation. The within-participants design included morality of other (moral versus morality-neutral versus immoral) and intelligence of other (intelligent versus intelligence-neutral unintelligent) as within-participant factors.
Procedure
Study 2 employed the same procedure as Study l, except that participants received two behavioral items per target person instead of one. The same behavioral descriptions were used as in Study 1. Morality behaviors were combined with intelligence behaviors, producing targets of nine dierent types: moral/intelligent, moral/neutral, moral/unintelligent, neutral/intelligent, neutral/neutral, neutral/unintelligent, immoral/intelligent, immoral/neutral, and immoral/unintelligent. Participants were paired with 18 targets, two of each type, the order of which was randomized separately for each participant. Two additional neutral behaviors, selected from the pretest described in the method of Study 1, formed a practice target that was presented ®rst in all versions and excluded from the analyses. Again, we attempted to diminish the possibility that speci®c characteristics of the behaviors would have unforeseen in¯uences on the results. First, two dierent sets of targets were constructed by using each behavior in dierent cells of the design in two versions. For instance, in one version a moral behavior was combined with an intelligent behavior, whereas in the other version the same moral behavior was combined with an unintelligent or a neutral behavior. Also, target gender was again varied systematically. Counterbalanced with other variations, half of the targets were male in one version and female in another version, and vice versa.
The morality behavior and the intelligence behavior of a target person were presented on the same screen. Counterbalanced across other variations, for half of the participants, the morality behavior was displayed ®rst; for the other half, the intelligence behavior was displayed ®rst. Finally, as in Study 1, order (impression ratings ®rst versus social dilemma ®rst) was varied systematically. Preliminary analyses showed no consistent pattern of eects including order, gender of participants, target set, target gender version, or type of behavior displayed ®rst. Hence, these variables will not be further discussed.
At the end of the experiment, participants were asked to write down all behaviors they could remember in words as close as possible to the original formulation. For this purpose, they received three sheets of paper containing a total of 21 blank boxes. They were asked to write down the two behaviors of the same person together in one box, giving each person his or her`own box' (i.e. if they remembered only one behavior of a person, they should write only one behavior in that box). In doing so, we were able to investigate not only the type of behaviors that participants recalled but also the type of target person they recalled. Participants were told that there were more boxes than there had been persons, so that they would not be able to ®ll in all boxes. Participants spent at least 7 and maximally 14 minutes completing this task.
Dependent Measures
Dependent measures included expected and own cooperation (none through four points), the dierence between these two, con®dence in expectations (À2 very uncon®dent, 2 very con®dent), global impressions (À2 very negative, 2 very positive), the proportion of moral, immoral, intelligent, unintelligent, and neutral behaviors recalled, and the proportion of correctly recalled complete targets.
Results and Discussion
For all dependent measures, except for free recall of behaviors, we analyzed mean scores across the two targets per category. The means for the nine target types are displayed in Table 2 , together with results of post-hoc contrast tests. For the recall data, the units of analysis were, ®rst, the proportion of correctly recalled behaviors per behavior category, and second, the proportion of correctly recalled complete targets per target category. These data were subjected to analyses of variance with morality and intelligence as within-participant factors. The results of these analyses are displayed in Table 3 , 5 together with the mean scores for all dependent measures across moral, morality-neutral, immoral, intelligent, intelligence-neutral, and unintelligent targets (which are more directly relevant to the hypotheses). As can be seen, the results are very similar to those of Study l. We found main eects for morality and intelligence on almost all dependent measures, the only exception again being that intelligence did not aect expectations. Again, targets described by positive behavior generally elicited more favourable impressions, and made participants expect and display greater levels of cooperation than targets described by negative behavior. Also, con®dence ratings were higher for targets described by informative versus neutral behaviors, and morality information was recalled better than neutral and intelligence information. As in Study 1, we addressed the morality-importance and the negativity eect hypotheses by computing a priori contrasts, again setting alpha at 0.01 to avoid capitalization on chance eects.
The Importance of Morality
First, as predicted by the morality-importance hypothesis, dierences between moral and immoral targets were more pronounced than dierences between intelligent and unintelligent targets, for global impressions (mean dierences of 2.08 versus 0.55; t[163] 24.37, p 5 0.0001), expected cooperation (mean dierences of 1.74 versus 5 As can be seen in Table 3 , the analyses revealed signi®cant interaction eects for global impressions, own cooperation, relative bene®t and the proportion of target persons recalled. For global impressions and own cooperation, this interaction is probably due to the impact of negative morality information: For own cooperation, intelligence has a strong eect for morality-neutral targets, a weaker eect for moral targets, and no eect for immoral targets (see Table 2 for means). Global impressions show a similar pattern, albeit less pronounced. Apparently, the impact of morality information, especially if negative, attenuates intelligence eects. These ®ndings are consistent with both the morality-importance and the negativity eect hypothesis.
For recall of target persons, the pattern of means shows that recall of immoral targets is large, except for unintelligent/immoral targets. This is consistent with behavioral-adaptive reasoning, as unintelligent targets probably imply no danger. Also, the pattern of means shows that morality-neutral/intelligenceneutral targets are recalled better than either morality-neutral/intelligent targets or morality-neutral/ unintelligent targets, which is consistent with the results of Study 1.
Finally, the interaction pattern for the dierence between expected and own cooperation shows that this relative bene®t is largest by far for unintelligent targets as long as they are not immoral. This ®nding will be discussed further in the text. Impression formation and cooperative behavior 317 0.05; t[163] 17.80, p 5 0.0001), and own cooperation (mean dierences of 1.42 versus 0.24; t[163] 16.37, p 5 0.0001). Another way in which the importance of morality was revealed is in the comparison of the two evaluatively ambiguous targets, that is, moral/unintelligent and immoral/intelligent targets (see Table 2 ). As can be seen, moral/unintelligent targets are consistently evaluated and approached more favourably than immoral/intelligent targets. As both targets are described positively on one dimension and negatively on the other, it is clear that the evaluative meaning of the morality information determines most strongly how the target is evaluated and approached. Second, participants overall expressed greater con®dence in expectations if morality information was present (all targets except morality-neutral targets) than if intelligence information was present (all targets except intelligence-neutral targets); means were 0.63 versus 0.50 t[162] 8.33, p 5 0.0001). Furthermore, morality behaviors were recalled better than intelligence behaviors (mean proportions were 0.53 versus 0.38; t[161] 11.03, p 5 0.0001). Also, complete targets (i.e. joint recall of both behaviors of a target) were recalled better if morality information about them was present than if intelligence information about them was present (mean proportions were 0.18 versus 0.15; t[161] 4.11, p 5 0.0001). These results provide strong support for the morality-importance hypothesis.
Evaluative Asymmetries
Morality eects As in Study 1, the negativity eect hypothesis received strong support. Dierences between targets described by immoral versus neutral behavior were greater than dierences between targets described by moral versus neutral behavior, for global impressions (mean dierences were 1.38 and 0.71, respectively; t[163] 12.09, p 5 0.0001), expected cooperation (mean dierences of 1.07 versus Note: Global impressions and con®dence ratings were made on 5-point scales ranging from À2 to 2; higher scores indicate more positive ratings Expected and own cooperation (and the dierence between them) are in points, with a minimum of 0 and a nd a maximum of 4. Proportions of recalled behaviors were computed for each behavior category separately; proportions of recalled target persons were computed for each target category separately. a df 2,162. b df 4,160. c separate ANOVAs per dimension, df 2,160. Due to missing values, degrees of freedom are based on N 163 for con®dence ratings and N 162 for recall data. Means in the same row and pertaining to the same dimension that do not share subscripts dier at least at p 5 0.05. * p 5 0.05. ** p 5 0.005. *** p 5 0.0001. 0.66; t[163] 6.52, p 5 0.0001), and own cooperation (mean dierences of 0.90 versus 0.52; t[163] 6.41, p 5 0.0001). Again, no negativity eects obtained on con®dence ratings and recall of behaviors; however, we did ®nd a negativity eect for recall of target persons. As can be seen in Table 3 , participants did not express greater con®dence in expectations based on immoral versus moral information, and they did not recall individual immoral behaviors better than moral behaviors. However, complete target persons were recalled better when they were immoral rather than moral.
Intelligence eects For intelligence, results were also similar to those obtained in Study 1. Negativity eects were found on global impressions and own cooperation. Dierences between targets described by unintelligent versus neutral behavior were greater than dierences between targets described by intelligent versus neutral behavior, for global impressions (mean dierences were 0.42 versus 0.13; t[163] 6.65, p 5 0.0001), and own cooperation (mean dierences were 0.21 versus 0.03; t[163] 3.30, p 5 0.002). Again, intelligence did not aect expected cooperation.
No evaluative asymmetries for intelligence were found on con®dence ratings or on the proportion of correctly recalled target persons, but this time, we did ®nd an asymmetry for recall of individual behaviors. Intelligent behaviors were recalled better than unintelligent behaviors (see Table 3 ).
The Dierence between Expected and Own Cooperation
As in Study l, we explored whether the dierences between the expected level of cooperation and the level of cooperation displayed varied with target type. Again, we found that participants expected more cooperation than they were willing to display themselves. As can be seen in Table 3 , relative bene®t was largest for moral targets relative to morality-neutral and immoral targets, and for unintelligent targets relative to intelligent and intelligence-neutral targets. Looking at the means in Table 2 , it can be seen that relative bene®t is by far largest for moral/unintelligent and for moralityneutral/unintelligent targets, suggesting that participants were inclined to increase their relative bene®t most with those unintelligent targets who were not immoral. However, as in Study 1, the small relative bene®t with immoral targets could result from a¯oor eect, for participants again expected so little cooperation from these targets that they could hardly be less cooperative themselves.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present research examined how we use evaluative person information pertaining to morality and intelligence in forming impressions of people, anticipating the cooperativeness of their behavior, and deciding how cooperatively we will behave ourselves. Two experiments supported hypotheses regarding the importance of morality information and the weight given to negative information. These results enhance our understanding of impression formation processes and their interactional consequences in a two-person mixed-motive interdependence situation (a social dilemma). The Importance of Morality
Consistent with the morality-importance hypothesis, impressions, expectations of other's cooperation, and own cooperative behavior in a social dilemma are more strongly in¯uenced by morality information than by intelligence information. In addition, people express greater con®dence in expectations based on morality rather than intelligence information, suggesting that morality is more relevant to behavior in this situation. Finally, morality information is recalled better than intelligence information.
In the introduction, we discussed why morality may have such a prominent meaning in a mixed-motive interdependence situation. Morality information is informative of a person's good or bad intentions with respect to other people, and therefore useful for inferring whether we can trust this person to be cooperative and, hence, whether we can safely choose to be cooperative ourselves without being exploited. Intelligence information, on the other hand, is less indicative of the trustworthiness of another person. Indeed, we did not ®nd intelligence to aect expectationsÐalthough we did ®nd that intelligence information was considered more useful for deriving expectations of another's cooperation than neutral information (as re¯ected in greater con®dence ratings). It may well be that most people thought it intelligent to cooperate in a mixed-motive situation, in order to get the best outcomes for all, whereas others considered it intelligent to try and get the best outcomes for self by taking a`free ride'.
An important question is whether morality is generally more important in person impressions than intelligence. The greater recall of morality over intelligence information, for example, may be due to dierences in attention, weighting, and processing caused by this particular interdependence choice task (the social dilemma). However, one might also argue that the recall advantage for morality information is not contingent to this particular context, but re¯ects a general tendency for people to be more interested in morality than intelligence. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that this might well be the case (cf. Wojciszke, 1994; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, in press) . At the same time, this tendency most probably ®nds its origins in interaction situations. For example, many real-world social situations involve a choice between one's own good and collective considerations, and therefore, inferring whether or not you can trust a person to do what is best for all (and hence, for you) is of paramount importance. So, someone's social, other-pro®table characteristics will almost always receive more attention and weight in a judgment of the person than self-pro®table, competence-related characteristics, as the latter are of less hedonic relevance for the perceiver (see Wojciszke, 1994) . (Exceptions, of course, are situations in which a competence-related judgment is expected.) Furthermore, socially evaluative information may have a broader meaning than intelligence information, such that, to a certain degree, the latter can be deduced from the former. People are more ready to conclude that a moral person is intelligent, or that an immoral person is unintelligent, than the opposite. 6 This is congruent with behavioral-adaptive reasoning. For 6 We found additional support for this claim by asking 14 participants to rate the intelligence of a moral person and an immoral person, and to rate the morality of an intelligent and an unintelligent person, on 7-point scales. Intelligence inferences from morality information were more extreme than morality inferences from intelligence information (1.46 versus 1.21; 1 scale midpoint, 4 scale extreme; t[13] 2.19, p 5 0.05). Also, participants who indicated that they could not draw morality inferences from intelligence information (i.e. who chose the scale midpoint for the latter two questions) reported to be Impression formation and cooperative behavior 321 example, people who display immoral behavior risk expulsion from the social group that could protect them (Stevens & Fiske, 1995) . Also, immoral behavior is unlikely to result in superior long-term outcomes (e.g. Axelrod, 1984) . So, in a sense, (im)moral behavior to some extent implies (un)intelligence.
Negativity Eects in an Interaction Context
The current research also revealed evidence in support of the negativity eect hypothesis. Impressions and cooperative behavior expected and displayed are more strongly in¯uenced by negative than by positive morality information, compared with neutral information. The ®nding that these negativity eects for morality information extend to behavioral expectations and own behavior is congruent with the idea that attending to socially negative information is important from an interaction perspective, as claimed by motivational explanations for negativity eects (e.g. Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; cf. De Dreu et al., 1995) . Attending to negative,`dangerous' person characteristics like immorality is especially functional in an interdependence situation, where these characteristics can actually exert their detrimental eects. We also found negativity eects for intelligence information on global impressions and own cooperative behavior, unlike previous research that demonstrated positivity eects in this domain (e.g. Reeder & Fulks, 1980; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987) . 7 These negativity eects seem to have a dierent meaning. Although no dierences in cooperation are expected from intelligent, intelligence-neutral, and unintelligent people, the latter are still evaluated extremely negatively and receive very little cooperation. The use people make of intelligence information is best discussed by looking at the dierences between expected and own cooperation.
Taking More Advantage of Some People than of Others
A general ®nding was that people overall expect to receive more cooperation than they are willing to display, a tendency we have referred to as relative bene®t. One might speculate that this tendency is fostered by the single-interaction nature of the current interdependence situation, as the other person will not be able to retaliate. Of course, we do not mean to conclude that people are always ready to deliberately and consciously take advantage of other people whenever possible. Probably, people would label their own behavior as cautious rather than exploitative, as one can never be sure of what the other does. However, it is striking that certain person characteristics more con®dent about their answers than participants who did draw morality inferences from intelligence information (i.e. who did not choose the scale midpoint for these questions; 6.25 versus 4.75; 1 very uncon®dent, 7 very con®dent; t[12] 2.87, p 5 0.05). 7 It might be argued that our method of using neutral, irrelevant information as a standard for comparison is more likely to produce negativity eects than a method that tests evaluative asymmetries against a zero scale point (for instance, if behavioral items, pretested to be equally extreme positive and negative on morality, are rated on a likability scale, e.g. Fiske, 1980;  or if pretested items are combined and this new stimulus is rated as a whole, e.g. Coovert & Reeder, 1990) , because neutral information tends to be perceived as somewhat positive compared to a zero scale point. However, this does not decrease the importance of our ®ndings: compared with irrelevant, neutral information, negative information has more impact than positive information.
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E. N. M. De Bruin and P. A. M. Van Lange promote the tendency to increase one's relative bene®t to the other. Also, it is worth noting that these eects were conjured up by only one or two descriptions of the behavior of a person. As we have seen, relative to other targets, unintelligent targets elicited very little cooperation. This is consistent with other ®ndings (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994; Van Lange & Semin-Goossens, 1998) showing that, when interdependent with unintelligent others, quite a few people try to obtain the best possible outcome for themselves, even if that means anticipating poor outcomes for the other. This ®nding cannot be accounted for by low levels of expected cooperation, as intelligence did not aect expectations. It is also not due to uncertainty of what an unintelligent person would do. In Study 2, we even found con®dence ratings to be greaterÐalbeit not signi®cantly soÐfor unintelligent than for intelligent target persons. Similarly, relative bene®t is large for moral targets, from whom high levels of cooperation were expected with relatively high con®dence.
Instead, the tendency to increase relative bene®t with unintelligent or moral people seems to suggest that these types of person information might be important partly from an opportunistic point of view, providing information about whether or not a person can be`safely' taken advantage of. Just as personality information can inform us about the trustworthiness of someone (`can I trust this person?'), it can also be informative about someone's trustfulness (`will this person trust me?'). It may be that moral people are perceived as very trustful because of their faith in others and unintelligent people because of their innocence (see Deutsch, 1973, pp. 146±147 ). In addition, these people may be perceived as relatively powerless: Moral people are not expected to do bad, immoral things to others (cf. Reeder & Spores, 1986; Reeder & Coovert, 1983; Reeder, Pryor, & Wojciszke, 1992) , and unintelligent people are probably not able to do so. Thus, unintelligent and moral people may be perceived as both cooperative and harmless, and therefore`exploitable'. Clearly, these intriguing yet complex issues concerning the possible mechanisms underlying relative bene®tÐ why people do not fully reciprocate levels of expected cooperationÐdeserve further empirical attention. In the meantime, it is interesting to note that, generally, motivational theories only stress the functionality of attending to possible negative consequences of environmental stimuli, including other persons. However, the ability to discern and pursue positive outcomes obviously has survival value too. Note that both tendencies are re¯ected in recall of the target persons:`dangerous' intelligent/ immoral or intelligence-neutral/immoral persons and`exploitable' moral/unintelligent persons are recalled best.
Strengths and Limitations
Before closing, we should brie¯y outline strengths and limitations of the current research, as well as some issues for future research. One limitation is that we have employed the same single-trial social dilemma in both studies. This task represents only one type of interdependence context, and one in which the possible behavioral repertoire is rather limited (cf. Kelley, 1984; Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996) . Indeed, it would be fruitful for future research to examine dierent interdependence situations, for instance in the form of iterated social dilemmas, or real-life interdependence situations. These could, for example, investigate patterns of interaction sequences, or Impression formation and cooperative behavior interaction situations that permit coordination between individuals. Nevertheless, social dilemma tasks form a useful point of departure for future research. First, they allow for studying`con¯ict without tears' (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977, p. 366) . Second, abstractness of outcomes (points) and anonymity enable us to study basic motivations in an ethical manner. A social dilemma is an appropriate research tool for investigating these basic behavioral tendencies and social motivations. Ultimately, these basic motivationsÐthe human dispositions to try to get the best and escape the worstÐshape all of our behaviors, most importantly our interactions with other people.
In the supermarket, he pushed a woman with a perambulator aside in order to get to the check±out before her.
When his neighbour had the¯u and asked him to do some shopping for her, he lied, telling her that he was unable to do it because he had an appointment.
When he found a purse with a lot of money in it, he kept the money and threw away the purse.
When an old lady, who was a bad walker, entered the bus, he looked the other way so that he did not need to stand up.
Intelligent Behaviors
He had prepared himself so well for the job interview, that he could express himself without any diculty.
In the classroom, he answered a question correctly to which no one else knew the answer.
He wrote a letter to the municipality that had exactly the right tone, and therefore he was granted a house rather quickly.
He solved a problem about which his friends had been thinking all day in less than 15 minutes.
He wrote such a good master's thesis, that he won a scholarship that enabled him to study abroad for a year.
When he saw that his direct supervisor was in a very bad mood, he decided to go and talk about a salary raise some other time.
Unintelligent Behaviors
He began to talk about a salary raise when it was clear that his employer was in a very bad mood.
When a business company asked him via his study advisor to work for them, he accepted the job without inquiring what kind of work it involved.
Although the bright light of the sun was troubling him very much, he left the shutters open, because he did not know how to close them.
Although he performed the written driving-test for the fourth time already, he failed again.
When it became clear that his ®rst stack of tickets had not won him a prize, he bought another stack of two hundred lottery tickets.
When he heard somebody say that one did not have to study the ®rst six chapters, he took this for granted and so he failed the exam.
Neutral Behaviors
Because the ®lm he was watching was terribly dull, he fell asleep on the sofa.
After having doubted for a moment whether he would buy chipolata pudding or toee-¯avoured custard, he chose the custard.
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When he discovered a hole in one of his socks while getting dressed, he took another pair from the wardrobe.
When he came home from work he ®rst checked whether there was any mail, and then read the newspaper.
In August, he took three weeks o in order to go on a holiday. He was more than an hour late for work, because his train was delayed due to an accident.
The ®rst time he happened upon the new ten-guilders coin, he looked at it in surprise.
During lunch break he talked with a fellow student, who told him about a television program of the night before.
Because it was extremely busy in the tram during rush hour, he had to put up with a stand.
Because he had an adverse wind, it took him ®ve minutes longer to get to work than usual.
After having watched the news, he checked whether there were any interesting programs on other channels. Just before closing time, he quickly went to the supermarket to buy a carton of milk and a package of coee. 
